Defining Neutrality II – Sweden (I)

Image ‘Gustavia -Old Swedish flag in Museum’, by Roger W. Released under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-SA 2.0) License.

 

The case of Sweden (Part I)

 

Switzerland is one of the most renown neutral nations in the last 100-200 years, and the particularities, reasons and future of its neutrality policies were reviewed in a couple of articles about its neutrality. But there is another remarkable international case of neutrality, another country with a long tradition of neutrality despite its former position of Great Power. That, indeed, might be the only difference in regards to the Swiss case, as many traits of its neutrality have considerable common elements with those of the Swiss case. However, it is important to remark that, regardless of some similarities, each case has its own characteristics. This country is Sweden, which for instance, was one of the neutral nations mostly affected by the geopolitical changes in its neighbourhood from 1814 onwards, especially during the 20^th century. As this country adopted a policy of neutrality in 1814, it had enjoyed some relative peace for 200 years, yet its neutrality policy that has not been entirely rigid – to put in in a way – in contrast to that of Switzerland.

A Precedent

Swedish neutrality is about 200 years old. But it seems that there was a brief precedent in which neutrality, at the most, was the main policy only by the name. As Müller (2011) points out, a brief period of neutrality took place from 1780 to 1783 and under King Gustav III, when Sweden took part in the (first) League of Armed Neutrality. But if these years could have marked the dawn of neutrality era, in reality Gustav III’s aim behind such membership responded to strategic and geopolitical interests thus setting aside these years as the time when neutrality began. For instance, he aimed at keep Denmark and Russia divided, and also to face Russia while restoring its former position as a Great Power (Müller, 2011)[1]. There was clearly no intention of keeping Sweden entirely neutral through this league.

There was also another factor behind Gustav III’s brief neutrality policies, and that was to benefit from trade through a free port (Mastrand, on the West Coast and near to Göteborg) in wartime, as it was the case with French and American privateers, which gave Sweden an opportunity to expand its commercial interests into the Atlantic and even into Asia, and to establish a colony policy (Müller, 2011)[2]. Furthermore, Swedish aim of joining the league was to protect its trade when hostilities should have sparked between the major powers, considering it had a fleet of 1224 trading ships, yet it found several opposition from other states part of that League – Denmark and Russia – that, in the end, marked the failure of it. And Sweden’s relative isolation also played a role. The very short-lived colonial policies of Sweden and the trade with Asia were the remarkable casualties of such failure (Müller, 2011).

After defeat, after victory, and the 19^th Century

Therefore, and after the failure of the League, Sweden simply resumed its war-like attitude, which had disastrous consequences for the nation. The period between 1809 and 1814 come as the accurate years marking the beginning of Sweden’s neutrality policy era. After 300 hundred years of frequent warfare, the Scandinavian nation simply decided to follow such a policy, giving up the previous great power politics and its aims of becoming a dominant Baltic power, and simply to avoid being entangled into wars given the policy of alliances (Bergman, 2004; Hetmanchuk, 2012; Ugwukah, 2015; Vaahtoranta & Forsberg, 2000)[3]. But the shocking loss of Finland after a brief war with Russia, whose loss was the result of an agreement between Russia and England to push away Sweden from England in exchange of taking Finland out of the Swedish Kingdom (Treaty of Tilsit). Sweden’s involvement in the Napoleonic Wars and the new government of King Karl XIV Johan, also set Sweden onto this course. For instance, and although neutrality started between 1812-1814, it was officially labelled as a state policy by King Karl XIV Johan by 1834, when increasingly hostile relations between Russia and the British Empire risked the Baltics to become a theatre of operations, allowed him to officialise neutrality both home and abroad, with impartiality taken as a main basis for such. Such neutrality policy was also meant to be implemented in case of war in the future (Basset, 2012; Edgren, 2009; Feldbæk, 2001; Globalsecurity, 2014; Gotkowska, 2012; Pashkov, 2009; SverigesRadio, 2009)[4].

In addition, there was a war against Denmark, which ultimately led into a Union between Norway and Sweden for almost a century, as well as to the beginning of Swedish neutrality, as it was the last war in which Sweden took part, shovelling for a time its hostility against Russia, and enjoying a sort of geographical isolation. This war was a product of an alliance between Sweden and both Russia and the United Kingdom, where Sweden agreed to contribute to the efforts against Napoleon and to give up any territorial claim on Finland, invaded and seized by Russia. In exchange, Sweden received Russian and British – mostly British – support in the Swedish-Danish war, which resulted in the union between Sweden and Norway, union clearly supported by Sweden’s new allies. Sweden also intended to claim Norway as part of its territory and against Denmark (Feldbæk, 2001; Sandbekken, 2005; Sweden.se, 2012; Westberg, 2013).

In any case, the policy of neutrality had various reasons for such being the only course the Scandinavian nation could take, by the hand of Karl XIV Johan. According to Basset (2012), the Napoleonic Wars and the revolution in military affairs – strategy tactics, the composition of the armies and even technology – along the military and economic losses Sweden sustained during the wars, the size and geographical isolation from Europe were the main factors behind the adoption of neutrality. Lundquist (2013), adds that this policy aimed at isolating Sweden from the rest of Europe too, yet being open to adapting to any circumstance that could provide an opportunity and reportedly being a policy that made Sweden to lean towards the British Empire than to Russia.

Furthermore, a policy of neutrality became a main ambition for it would guarantee a more independent path in regards to international affairs, and since Sweden was geographically located between two major Great Powers – this situation would repeat itself during the Cold War – having strong interests with both, it wanted to protect them, following Ugwukah (2015). Such interests were trade interests and to address the large military power and proximity of Russia, and to maintain the industrial, commercial and naval interests with the British Empire. (Ugwukah, 2015)[5].

But neutrality was not a permanent, easy policy for Sweden to maintain. For instance, Sweden’s way to safeguard its national security forced it to stretch its neutrality and non-alignment. First, Sweden tended to orientate to different great powers – Russia, the British Empire and then Germany – to grant its security[6]. Second, three small wars that had the Baltic region as scenario took place, testing Sweden’s neutrality and resolve to keep it – though it was Sweden’s relative weakness what prevented in the end its participation by Denmark’s side on the Schleswig War – and the changing balance of power following the Prussian victory of 1870. Third, the introduction of the railway and iron-clad warships almost neutralized the almost isolated and semi-insular position Sweden had (Ugwukah, 2015).

Furthermore, and in relation to the first and second issues, the successors of Karl XIV Johan – Oskar I and Karl XV – implemented rather a policy of military alignment, by sending 4000 soldiers to assist Denmark in reasserting its authority over Schleswig and Holstein, following a desire of the German population to join the German confederation and an invasion by some German states in 1848. 1855 was the year in which the Crimea War sparked, with some British and French warships operating at the Baltics as it became another theatre of operation, prompting Sweden to sign an alliance with both the Great Britain and France, further eroding Sweden’s neutrality. But Sweden would retake an absolute path of neutrality during the 1863 Dane-Prussian War, refusing to send military support to Denmark and adopting a neutral and ‘passive’ policy, which would last until WWI (Feldbæk, 2001; Ugwukah, 2015).

The turn of the Century: The First World War and the aftermath – roots of Swedish Armed neutrality

Swedish neutrality was a policy that was difficult to implement, as it was mentioned before, yet it was intended to be indeed flexible and adaptable to the circumstances and opportunities the event would provide. It is perhaps this flexibility that explains why Sweden’s neutrality have been controversial, especially during the 20^th century, where its neutrality and ‘non-alignment’ policy was put under question many times, following some stances and actions that Sweden took during this period. And it also explains why it has been able to endure the different tests it faced throughout its implementation.

During World War I, Sweden remained neutral and therefore out of the carnage. As Lindström (1997) and Basset (2012) points out, when the crises that sparked in 1912 – which accelerated the pace towards World War I – at the Balkans, and North Africa took place, Sweden – alongside Denmark and Norway – declared its commitment to neutrality. Therefore, Sweden remained out of the war[7]. But even if neutrality was a national policy of Sweden, it was not entirely accepted and it faced a risk, though not that considerable, of being derogated. During WWI, in fact, there was a considerable group of Swedes (some of the royals) that supported Germany, wanting the country to lean towards the German Empire as it was having a strong political, economic, cultural and military influence over the Scandinavian nation. France and Great Britain were also a subject of sympathies in Sweden, but as Russia was part of the Entente – and the sour memories of 1809 were still fresh – it made difficult for many to fully support the Entente, even pleading for Sweden to join the War on the Side of the Central Empires (Chi-Kyu, 2007; sverigeturism, n.d. SverigesRadio, 2014)

However, and despite this fact and the fact that the then Swedish Prime Minister – Hjalmar Hammarskjöld – and many military officers, public servants and Social Democratic Party were very friendly towards the German Empire, King Gustav V’s cautiousness prevailed and therefore Sweden remained neutral, implementing also and for the first time a policy of Armed Neutrality, following Chi-Kyu, (2007), Sweden.se (2012) and sverigeturism, (n.d.). This armed neutrality policy was to become one of the main traits of Swedish neutrality from there on, just as the Swiss neutrality. Thus, Sweden’s foreign policies were standing on three pillars: neutrality-passiveness, non-alignment and armed neutrality.

Yet the absolute isolationism proved to be hard to accomplish, as the conflict affected Sweden strongly, prompting also Sweden to lean towards England and the Allies. As Sweden was exporting food to the German Empire, the blockade imposed by the allies began to affect the economy, and as a bad harvest and imports of food took place at the same time, the country had to reach an agreement with the Allies in order to get supplies and food. The political sympathies also changed during the conflict, turning towards the British Empire instead of the German Empire (sverigeturism, n.d.). This fact alone challenges the ‘non-alignment’ of Sweden, and evidences that inner politics would have made this rather impossible to accomplish. The same would go for ‘passiveness’.

Neutrality was also put under question abroad by Swedish inner affairs. The abovementioned discussions between the neutralists and the pro-Germany groups was one factor. Another one was a domestic political crisis that had its origins over King Gustav V desire for the military service extension to be rapidly defined, and the following resignation of the liberal prime minister, the conformation of a conservative cabinet and their dissolution of the second chamber (Ugwukah, 2015).

Then, after the war ended, an event taking place in the neighbouring Finland would further test Swedish neutrality, passiveness and non-alignment, let alone the idea of isolation. When the Independence and Civil war sparked in the new-born nation, Sweden undertook some actions that spoke against its neutrality, as during the war it firstly occupied the Åland Islands at the west of Finland (with a large Swedish population), prompting the League of Nations to request Sweden to return the island[8]. And then, at the same time, a group of Swedish volunteers (up to a thousand) assisted the Whites against the Reds (Russian/Soviets aiming at keeping control over Finland through a communist state) during the Independence and the Civil war under Gustav von Mannerheim’s command, and notably taking part at the Battle of Tampere while fighting side-to-side with the famous Prussian-trained Jägers and 12000 German soldiers (Juhani & et.al, n.d.; Sakshaug, 1969; Sparks, 2014; SverigesRadio, 2014).

Moreover, Sweden also intervened in the Estonian Independence War, or at least volunteers of this nationality actively participated in this conflict, supporting the new-born state’s armed forces in their fight against both Russia/Soviet and German forces. Even a Swedish major – Martin Ekström – took command over the Finnish volunteer unit that took part as well in the liberation of Estonia[9].

In any case, and as Ugwukah (2015) points out, Swedish neutrality practically resisted the domestic context, gaining a very special position in the country as it basically avoided it the havoc and suffering the war brought upon the belligerents, laying also the basis for Sweden to contribute to other, more high causes in the times to come.

These actions overall suggest that, while having neutrality as main foreign policy North, Sweden was somewhat prepared to assert its interest proactively, almost re-implementing its old great power politics. And perhaps these actions indeed reflect the very flexible and circumstantial nature of Swedish neutrality. The times that were about to come (the World War II, the Cold War and the post-Cold War and 21^st Century) were about to stress further Swedish neutrality, let alone that Swedish stance on its own neutrality vis-à-vis the international context was about to be tested. These facts, which made Swedish neutrality very particular from that of Switzerland, are going to be pointed out and analysed further in the next part, where a question about Sweden’s neutrality before the new security and geopolitical context will be done as well.

___________

Footnotes

[1] And it seems that, according to Müller (2011), Sweden’s implementation of neutral policies can be traced back to the Anglo-Dutch Wars, the Anglo-French Wars and even the American War of Independence, profiting from those policies at least in trade.

[2] Another free port, Slite, in Gotland, was not successful due to Russia’s reluctance to support it, as it could have harmed Denmark, its closest Baltic ally, and its negative to establish commercial relations with Sweden. See: Müller, 2011, p.147-148.

[3] Noteworthy to remark that, following Ugwukah (2015), Swedish neutrality is based upon a definition of neutrality by the Hague’s convention of 1807.

[4] Edgren (2009) even suggests that the loss of Finland served Sweden, by avoiding the possibility of another war with Russia. Nonetheless, this might be a factor among many – neutrality included – to explain this phenomenon. And perhaps this loss might have helped to reach a settlement that allowed too the materialization of neutrality.

[5] Or as Basset (2012) puts it, Sweden desired to preserve its territory and sovereignty, as well as to protect its economy from the effects of war. See: p.10.

[6] Cfr. Andren (As quoted in Ugwukah, 2015), p. 33.

[7] Cfr. Bergman, 2004 p,6; and Chi-Kyu, 2007.

[8] However, and following Sakshaug (1969), the Swedish occupation of Åland was justified as the Swedish population was being harassed by Russian soldiers following the Russian Revolution, thus requesting for unification with Sweden, which in turn sent troops to protect the Swedish population that was subjected to aggression by the Russians.

[9] Cfr. Kalevipoeg. (2006). The Estonian Liberation War. Retrieved from: http://www.allempires.com/article/index.php?q=estonian_liberation_war on 22.10.2016

__________

Sources

Basset, B. (2012). Factors Influencing Sweden’s Changing Stance on Neutrality. Retrieved from: https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/bitstream/handle/2142/34336/Bassett_Bergen.pdf?sequence=1 on 16.10.2016

Bergmann, A. (2004). Post-Cold War Shifts in Swedish and Finnish Security Policies: The compatibility of non-alignment and participation in EU led conflict prevention. (Paper). Retrieved from: https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/49b849a8-45b3-44cb-aca4-280060f1fa4a.pdf 16.10.2016

Chi-Kyu, S. (2007). Sweden and world War I. ZUM.de. Retrieved from: https://www.zum.de/whkmla/sp/0708/chikyu/chikyu1.html on 22.10.2016

Edgren, H. (2009). When Finland was Lost. Background, Course of Events and Reactions. NOREUROPAforum 19(2), 61-82. Retrieved from: http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/nordeuropaforum/2009-2/edgren-henrik-61/PDF/edgren.pdf on 21.10.2016

Felbæk, O. (2001). Denmark in the Napoleonic Wars. A Foreign Policy Survey. In: Scandinavian Journal of History 26(2), 89-101. Retrieved from: http://www.kb.dk/export/sites/kb_dk/en/nb/komponentgalleri/nb/713787158x1x.pdf on 20.10.2016

Globalsecurity. (2014). Swedish Neutrality. Retrieved from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/se-neutrality.htm on 27.10.2016

Gotkowska, J. (2012). Sitting on the Fence. Swedish Defence Policy and the Baltics Sea Region. In: Point of View, 33. Centre for Eastern Studies. Warsaw, Poland. Retrieved from: https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_szwecja_ang_net.pdf on 20.04.2014

Hetmanchuck, N. (2012). Swedish Foreign Policy: Neutrality vs. Security. Retrieved from: http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/conferences/2012/2AHetmanchuk_Swedish.pdf on 16.10.2016

Juhani & et.al. (n.d). Swedish Brigade. War of Independence. Mannerheim.fi. Retrieved from: http://www.mannerheim.fi/06_vsota/e_ruotpr.htm on 20.04.2014

Kalevipoeg. (2006). The Estonian Liberation War. All Empires. Retrieved from: http://www.allempires.com/article/index.php?q=estonian_liberation_war on 22.10.2016

Lindström, G. (1997). Sweden’s Security Policy: Engagement – the Middle Way. Occasional Paper (2), 1-58. Retreived from: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/occ002.pdf on 21.10.2016

Lundquist, D. (2013). Swedish Security & Defence Policy 1990 – 2012. The transformation from neutrality to solidarity through a state identity perspective. urn:nbn:se:fhs:diva-3821. Stockholm, Sweden. Retrieved from: http://fhs.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:626364/FULLTEXT01.pdf on 02.02.104

Müller, L. (2011). Sweden’s neutral trade under Gustav III: The ideal of commercial independence under the predicament of political isolation. In Stapelbroek, K. (Ed.). Collegium 10, 143-160. Retrieved from: https://helda.helsinki.fi/bitstream/handle/10138/25834/010_08_Muller_2011.pdf;sequence=1 on 16.10.2016

Pashkov, M. (2009). Swedish Security Model: Peace-loving, Well-armed Neutrality. National Security & Defence (1), 40-43. Retrieved from: http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/files/category_journal/NSD105_eng_9.pdf on 16.10.2016   

Sakhshaug. E.C. (1969). Aspects of the Åland Islands Question. Dissertations and Theses. Paper 745. Retrieved from:  http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1744&context=open_access_etds on 22.10.2016

Sparks, (2014). The Warfare Historian. Finland’s Civil War 1918: Red & White Suomi and the Kinship Wars, 1918-1922. Retrieved from: http://warfarehistorian.blogspot.de/2014/02/finlands-civil-war-1918-red-white-suomi.html on 20.04.2014

SverigesRadio. (2009). 200 Years Since Sweden Loses Finland. Sveriges Radio. Retrieved from: http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=166&artikel=3043041  on 21.10.2016

SverigesRadio. (2014). “Swedish activism” in WWI. SverigesRadio. Retrieved from: http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&artikel=5931605 on 21.10.2016

Sverigeturism. (n.d.). The 20^th century. Sverigeturism. Retrieved from: http://www.sverigeturism.se/smorgasbord/smorgasbord/society/history/20th.html on 22.10.2016

Sweden.se. (2012). History of Sweden: War, Peace and Progress. Sweden.se. Retrieved from: https://sweden.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/History-of-Sweden-high-resolution.pdf on 16.10.2016

Ugwukah, A. (2015). Neutrality as Foreign Policy Principle: A Historical Evaluation of Swedish Posture. Historical Research Letters 17,27-42. Retrieved from: http://www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/HRL/article/view/20141 on 16.10.2016

Vaahtoranta, T. & Forsberg, T. (2000). Post-Neutral or Pre-Allied? Finnish and Swedish Policies on the EU and NATO as Security Organizations. UPI Working Papers (29), 2-43. Retrieved from:  on

Westberg, J. (2013). Sweden’s policy of neutrality. In: Novaković, I. S. (Ed.). Neutrality in the 21^st Century – Lessons for Serbia, Essay Compendium. Retrieved from: http://www.isac-fund.org/download/NEUTRALNOST-ENG-F-2WEB.pdf on 16.10.2016